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The Reconstruction of Post-war Kuwait: A Missed Opportunity? 
SULTAN BARAKAT AND JOHN SKELTON 
Abstract 
The reconstruction of Kuwait, following its occupation by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 
1990, constitutes a significant though rarely studied episode of post-war recovery. On 
the eve of liberation in 1991, Kuwait faced a number of challenges including physical 
rehabilitation and reconstruction, political and constitutional issues, reconciling a deeply 
divided population and socio-economic recovery. The passing of more than twenty years 
since Kuwait’s liberation allows the paper to reflect, from a long-term perspective, on 
the decisions which were taken following liberation and how these have impacted the 
country’s subsequent political, social and economic trajectory. The timeliness of such an 
examination has been highlighted by the contemporary ongoing political crisis in 
Kuwait in the context of the Arab Spring, at the centre of which stands a widely 
perceived, long-standing deficit of the Al Sabah regime’s political legitimacy. The paper 
argues that had Kuwait’s reconstruction assumed a different shape, it is conceivable that 
the country would have experienced a profoundly different development trajectory over 
the following two decades. The authors contend that Kuwait’s contemporary political 
and socio-economic crises have their roots in a post-war reconstruction model which 
delivered substantial success in physical and rapid macro-economic recovery, but which 
did not fully realise opportunities to establish an accountable and trusted governance 
system, promote reconciliation and equality between divided groups, and encourage 
sustainable social and economic development. The paper argues that the opportunity to 
deliver long-term benefits was undermined by a non-holistic post-war vision dominated 
by notions of regime security which in turn necessitated renewed post-war business-as-
usual authoritarianism, exclusionary nationalist policies and the recreation of the pre-
war power-for-welfare political trade-off. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the reconstruction of Kuwait following its occupation by Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq in 1990–1 – a subject that has until now been rarely addressed despite the 
regional political significance of the Gulf War and its aftermath. The rebuilding of Kuwait 
constitutes a significant episode of post-war recovery, with the Kuwaitis leveraging the 
technical assistance of western construction and engineering firms for project implementation 
through a combination of oil wealth and high international political stakes. On the eve of 
liberation, Kuwait faced a number of challenges: physical reconstruction, socio-economic 
recovery, political and constitutional issues, and the need to reconcile a deeply divided 
population. The central aim of the paper is to reflect on how decisions taken following 
liberation impacted the country’s subsequent political, social and economic trajectory. This 
inquiry is achieved through situating the Kuwaiti experience within a post-war reconstruction 
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conceptual framework which emphasizes both the challenges facing post-war development 
and its uniquely transformative potential. 
Now, more than twenty years after Kuwait’s liberation, there is a clear opportunity to 
assess reconstruction efforts from a long-term perspective. This timeliness has been 
highlighted by the contemporary ongoing political crisis in Kuwait, in which the Al Sabah 
regime’s widely perceived deficit in political legitimacy has, since 2010, been dramatically 
expressed in the regional context of the Arab Spring and its mutations. 
The paper argues that had Kuwait’s reconstruction assumed a different shape, it is 
conceivable that the country would have subsequently experienced a profoundly different 
development trajectory. The authors contend that Kuwait’s contemporary political and socio-
economic crises are rooted in a post-war reconstruction model that delivered substantial 
success in physical and short-term macro-economic recovery, but which did not fully realize 
opportunities to establish an accountable and trusted system of governance, rebuild trust and 
reconciliation between divided groups, and promote sustainable and equitable social and 
economic development. The paper argues that the long-term benefits of reconstruction were 
undermined by a non-holistic post-war vision dominated by notions of regime security. This in 
turn led to a post-war return to authoritarianism, exclusionary nationalist policies and the pre-
war power-for-welfare political and economic system, justified publicly by claims of 
exceptional circumstances amid a national emergency. This missed opportunity for a more 
transformational post-war vision, based on principles of democracy and social justice, is now 
increasingly clear, especially given the mass protests against political and social governance 
that have engulfed the country since 2011. 
Following this introduction, the second part of this paper discusses Kuwait’s 
contemporary political and development challenges, focusing in particular on the country’s 
long-standing political crisis coming to the fore in the context of the Arab Spring. The third 
section compares these contemporary challenges with those facing Kuwait on the eve of 
liberation and even before the Iraqi invasion. It is shown that these past concerns, including 
pressure for political reform and economic difficulties, in many ways mirror the contemporary 
challenges facing Kuwaiti today. The fourth part proposes a conceptual framework for 
analysing post-war reconstruction, encompassing both political and economic development 
challenges. The fifth section describes the reconstruction planning and implementation 
rebuilding activities undertaken both during and in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion. The 
sixth section evaluates Kuwait’s experience of post-war reconstruction through applying the 
proposed reconstruction framework. The authors conclude by identifying a series of insights 
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which are particularly pertinent to the Kuwaiti case but are also relevant to post-war 
reconstruction efforts in other contexts. 
2. KUWAIT’S ARAB SPRING AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE AL SABAH REGIME 
Since 2006, Kuwait has experienced a prolonged state of political paralysis, characterized by 
ongoing deadlock between the appointed Cabinet and elected National Assembly. Popular 
demands for greater political representation lie at the heart of the impasse, with the paramount 
issue being the ruling family’s control of the government and its lack of accountability to the 
elected parliament. While the Kuwaiti system is the most politically inclusive amongst the 
Gulf monarchies, the regime has been clear in its position that the opposition’s demands for 
the Al Sabah family members to cede control of the government constitute a ‘red line’ which 
it is not willing to cross (Gause 2013: 22). 
While Kuwait’s political crisis is long-standing, the regional dynamics of the Arab 
Spring had an aggravating effect, tightening Kuwait’s political tensions to breaking point. 
Despite the regional context, though, few in Kuwait have rejected the monarchy wholesale; 
nor have protests been galvanized by the sectarian rivalries (Hearst 2012). However, as in 
uprisings elsewhere, protests have been provoked by a deficit of political legitimacy 
underpinned by perceptions of corruption, lack of accountable governance and a dearth of 
economic transparency. The protests have also been driven by perceptions of the socio-
economic marginalization of certain groups, especially amongst tribes, youth and the Bidun 
population (Ghabra 2014).
1
 While the political system has been the central issue which has 
underpinned popular dissatisfaction, mass protests have also been driven by perceived 
structural injustices within Kuwaiti society. During 2011 and 2012, thousands of Kuwait’s 
100,000 stateless Bidun population protested against their lack of rights, including citizenship 
(Amnesty International 2013). Members of the Bidun movement have bonded with opposition 
groups, joining street demonstrations that demanded political reforms (Ghabra 2014). 
Following a corruption scandal which instigated months of anti-government 
demonstrations and the storming of the National Assembly building by protestors in 
November 2011, the prime minister, Nasser Al-Mohammed Al-Ahmed Al Sabah, was forced 
to resign (CNN 2011). National Assembly elections were held in February 2012, and were 
won by the opposition in a landslide victory. However, political tensions escalated when the 
                                                          
1
 The Bidun mostly originate from the following backgrounds: a first group are descendants of those who failed 
to apply for citizenship at the time the 1959 Nationality Law came into force. A second group are those originally 
from Iraq, Jordan and Syria, who settled in Kuwait in the 1960s having been recruited into Kuwait’s police and 
army services. The third group are children of Kuwaiti mothers and stateless or foreign fathers. 
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Constitutional Court annulled the election results and called for a new election, a move 
branded by the opposition as a ‘coup against the constitution’. After the reinstated parliament 
failed to function due to boycotts by the majority of MPs, the emir unilaterally modified the 
electoral law by decree, without the consent of the National Assembly, reducing the number of 
votes held by each Kuwaiti from four to one. The act was condemned by critics as a move to 
weaken the opposition and sparked mass protests, with up to 100,000 gathering to call for 
constitutional amendments to establish a fully elected government. In an unprecedented 
display of defiance, the leading opposition politician, Musallam al-Barrak, directly addressed 
the emir, stating ‘we will not allow you, your highness, to take Kuwait to the abyss of 
autocracy’, with his sentiment echoed by thousands of marchers (Gause 2013: 22). Subsequent 
political developments witnessed elections held in December 2012 and July 2013, both of 
which were boycotted by a range of liberal, Islamist and tribal candidates (BBC 2013). 
Meanwhile, Kuwait’s rising population increasingly challenges the sustainability of the 
government’s fiscal model. Warning of the need to take measures to promote sustainable 
growth, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has urged the Kuwaiti government to reduce 
its reliance on revenue from the oil sector and to reform its expenditure structure through 
shifting the current emphasis on welfare provision to capital expenditure (IMF 2012). 
The core point is this: a little over twenty years since the rebuilding of the country, 
Kuwait is again experiencing a period of profound political instability coupled with 
burgeoning socio-economic challenges. 
3. KUWAIT’S CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE AFTERMATH OF WAR 
Despite the brevity of the 1990–1 conflict, Kuwait faced a wide array of challenges upon its 
liberation, with the effects of the war compounded by pre-existing structural issues. In the 
years prior to the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait had become increasingly unstable politically. In 1986 
the emir suspended the National Assembly and cracked down on civil freedoms. The move 
was justified in language that invoked threats posed to internal security in the context of the 
Iran–Iraq war and followed a severe intensification of political violence in Kuwait. Three 
years earlier, the US and French embassies and oil installations had been attacked, and in 1985 
the emir survived an assassination attempt (Ulrichsen 2012b). Although the Iran–Iraq war 
ended in 1988, the government resisted calls for the restoration of parliamentary rule. 
Throughout 1989 and 1990, political arrests of opposition figures continued (Nafisi 1991) and 
restrictions were enforced on press freedoms and the right to public assembly (Human Rights 
Watch 1990). In 1990, the government sought to neutralize mounting pressure for democratic 
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reform by appointing a National Council (a weaker body than the National Assembly). 
However, many groups dismissed the move as unconstitutional and boycotted the subsequent 
elections, held in June 1990. 
Ironically, deeper political conflict was avoided only by the Iraqi invasion in August of 
that year; although the war forced the royal family into exile, in some ways the regime had 
already been deposed. Still, political tensions were to be exacerbated further by the 
experiences of the war itself. In particular, the government’s failure to defend the population 
during the war seriously undermined its credibility in the eyes of the wider population 
(Katzman 2005: 2). As a newspaper reported in 1991, ‘those who had survived the Iraqis – and 
especially those who resisted – had a newfound pride. They hoped that Kuwait would be not 
just rebuilt but reshaped into a more democratic, self-reliant, purposeful society’ (Efron 1991). 
Opposition leaders articulated the desired reforms in clear terms: the restoration of 
constitutional and accountable government (legitimized through elections for the National 
Assembly), respect for human rights and a free press (Gargan 1991). 
The intensification of domestic political tensions in the period preceding the Iraq 
invasion was accompanied by an increasing strain on social cohesion. The security incidents 
described above led to paranoia amongst the establishment about the loyalty of various 
communities in Kuwaiti society. In particular, during the 1980s there was a marked increase in 
concern among the political elite regarding Iranian ideological influence on Kuwait’s Shi’a 
population, estimated to constitute between 15 and 25 per cent of the country’s population. 
Consequently, restrictions were enforced on the activities of Shi’a community leaders and 
associations, including the dissolution of the board of directors of the Shi’a Social and 
Cultural Association in 1989 (Human Rights Watch 1990). During this period, domestic 
security concerns were also focused on Kuwait’s 250,000-strong Bidun population,2 
composed of those who lacked Kuwaiti (or any other country’s) citizenship and were therefore 
stateless. In 1985, the government changed the status of Bidun from legal residents without 
nationality to that of illegal residents – despite the fact that Bidun comprised the majority of 
the Kuwaiti army (Human Rights Watch 2011: 14). 
The pre-war period was also characterized by sharpened divisions between Kuwaiti 
citizens and expatriates. As during the 1980s, ‘the idea began to percolate among the power 
elite that expatriates, especially political activists, were threatening Kuwait’s culture, societal 
integrity, and political system’ (Pfeifer 2004: 213). Arab expatriate workers were the subject 
                                                          
2
 As is explained later in the paper, the Bidun population decreased hugely in the period following the war, such 
that, soon after the war, the 250,000 Bidun present in Kuwait before the war had been reduced to 100,000. 
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of particular suspicion, leading to the formulation of a nationalistic labour policy in 1983, 
which aimed to promote the ‘Kuwaitization’ of employment and decrease the level of 
expatriate labour, especially Arabs, to the furthest extent possible. Consequently, by the time 
of the invasion in 1990, there had been a significant shift in the demographic composition of 
expatriate workers from Arab to Asian (ibid.). 
Perceived pre-war social fragmentation was exacerbated by the Iraqi occupation, with 
sharp divisions emerging between those who remained in Kuwait during the war and those 
who fled to exile. Many of the estimated 150,000 Kuwaitis who remained harboured 
resentment against the regime and others who fled to Saudi Arabia, the US or elsewhere 
during the invasion and experienced the war in relative luxury (Gargan 1991). Having suffered 
greatly during the war and having formed the backbone of the anti-Iraqi resistance, these 
groups felt they deserved a more substantive role in the country’s post-war development 
(Yetiv 2002: 263). 
On the eve of liberation, these social and political divisions were compounded by 
developmental challenges and vulnerabilities built into Kuwait’s pre-war economic system. 
The economy’s reliance on the oil sector had been highlighted during the 1980s fall in oil 
prices, which saw Kuwait’s oil revenues in 1988 ending at 58 per cent of their 1974 value. As 
a consequence, the years preceding the Iraqi invasion had been characterized by inconsistency 
in economic growth, most starkly illustrated by a fall of 12.5 per cent in GDP per capita in 
1985 (Pfeifer 2004). Economic problems were exacerbated by the lack of expected growth in 
non-oil production sectors, the result of a combination of Dutch Disease and the debt crisis 
caused by the Souk al-Manakh stock market crash of 1982. Consequently, there was a marked 
decrease in non-oil manufacturing and worker productivity between 1976 and 1984. Yet in 
spite of various strategies to reduce Kuwait’s reliance on the oil sector, core issues of lack of 
investment and productivity growth were unaddressed, with the consequence that the private 
sector’s share of non-oil GDP decreased between 1982 and 1988, from 67 per cent to 55 per 
cent (ibid.). 
Challenges to economic development were intensified by the effects of the Iraqi 
occupation. During the oil boom period of the 1970s, the Kuwaiti government invested 
heavily in the infrastructure required to create a modern state and enable rapid economic and 
social advances (Fennell 1997). Much of this progress was abruptly rolled back due to 
infrastructural damage resulting from the war (although the damage was less extensive than 
anticipated) (McDonnell 1999: 71). The oil industry was particularly badly damaged as a 
result of the retreating Iraqi army’s ‘scorched earth’ campaign, in which more than seven 
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hundred oil wells were set on fire (Metz 1993). The consequent destruction of domestic oil 
production capacity meant that oil exports were suspended during the occupation and the 
following year, seriously impacting government revenue, which fell by 66 per cent in 1990–1 
(Fennell 1997). Additionally, serious damage was inflicted on other infrastructure, including 
power stations, air and sea ports, health and educational facilities, and public and private 
buildings (Al-Bahar 1991). The country’s post-war economic challenges were further 
exacerbated by a decline in investment income due to the reduction of foreign assets, much of 
which had been used to finance the reconstruction. 
As the above discussion has highlighted, the immediate post-war period found Kuwait 
facing severe political, social and economic challenges. Yet the rebuilding process also 
constituted an opportunity to address long-standing deficits. On the political front, the 
occupation constituted a watershed, offering the possibility of ushering in a new set of 
consensual and trusting political relations between the regime, elite opposition politicians and 
resistance leaders. The post-war moment also provided an opportunity to reflect on the 
country’s economic development vulnerabilities. Pfeifer (2004: 204) has asserted that in spite 
of the suffering that the war caused Kuwait, ‘the crisis and subsequent liberation offered its 
government and people a unique opportunity to reinvigorate their previously stagnant 
economy’. 
However, as described above in section 2, twenty years on from the country’s post-war 
reconstruction, Kuwait is again in the midst of a political crisis not dissimilar from the pre-war 
state–society impasse. A noteworthy fact, therefore, is how much the structural tension at the 
core of the country’s political and socio-economic systems remained unchanged in the post-
war period. In understanding Kuwait’s apparent cyclical development trajectory, decisions 
taken in the immediate post-war period are of particular importance. This is the central topic 
addressed in the remainder of this paper. 
4. POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The process of rebuilding societies in the aftermath of war is not a new enterprise, having 
accompanied centuries of war-making. Nevertheless, the twentieth century witnessed post-war 
reconstruction efforts on unprecedented scales. Arguably the archetypal example of post-war 
reconstruction was the massive US-led investment in the reconstruction of the defeated 
powers of Germany and Japan following World War II, organized around the European 
Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), which sought to ensure regional cooperation around 
reconstruction and development as the foundation of sustaining peace in Europe. To facilitate 
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such a complex process of economic and political collaboration among former enemies, the 
plan involved the establishment of a global economic architecture spearheaded by the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later the World Bank), the IMF and 
the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (later the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development). 
Post-war reconstruction generally encompasses three broad aims. First is the 
humanitarian goal centred on the impulse to save lives, with related projects often spearheaded 
by UN agencies and a vast array of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). A 
second objective of reconstruction concerns security goals. Traditionally, the main actors of 
reconstruction (leading international states and intergovernmental institutions) have viewed 
such processes through the lens of their own security interests. Thus, during the Cold War, 
reconstruction was shaped by the global rivalry between the United States and the USSR. 
During this time, aid in the form of official development assistance (ODA) was commonly 
tied to donors’ strategic and economic objectives, against a backdrop of proxy wars fought 
between the two superpowers in many countries, including Chile, Nicaragua, El Salvador, 
Israel/Palestine, Iran and Somalia. The end of the Cold War diminished the strategic 
importance that leading states placed on some of these areas, resulting in a decrease in ODA 
during the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, the unprecedented increase in post-war situations and humanitarian need 
that emerged in the early 1990s meant that a range of post-war reconstruction projects were 
undertaken during the years on either side of the turn of the century in war-torn societies as 
diverse as Bosnia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan. The perception that many 
such contexts represented ‘new wars’ (Kaldor 2006), characterized by unprecedented 
involvement of civilians as both victims and perpetrators, as well as by the intersection of 
political and criminal violence, led scholarly and practical attention to focus on internal 
security challenges, including weapons reduction; disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR) of former combatants; and security sector reform (Muggah 2005). The 
focus on internal security has been further bolstered post-9/11, with the growing perception 
that so-called weak, fragile or failed states constitute the major security threats to western 
states. A consequence has been large-scale reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq and 
elsewhere, where such efforts have assumed strong stabilization and institution-building 
characteristics, under the broader framework of state-building. In a number of locations, such 
as Sri Lanka, reconstruction has assumed an ‘illiberal’ form, where post-war activities have 
been shaped by the interests of authoritarian regimes (Hoglund and Orjuela 2012). 
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In addition to humanitarian and security objectives, the third and arguably most 
fundamental aspect of reconstruction concerns development objectives. While development 
challenges are often accompanied by humanitarian and military security concerns, it has 
nevertheless been argued that such challenges are usually temporary and do not alter the 
fundamentally developmental nature of the rebuilding challenge (Stiefel 1998: 16). 
Development objectives are directly related to humanitarian and security goals; for example, 
security, participatory governance and justice are required to enable economic and social 
development. At the same time, the ‘peace dividends’ brought about by development – if such 
benefits are evenly experienced – can address drivers of conflict and enhance political and 
social reconciliation. 
In the post-Cold War period, there has also been a shift in approaches to 
reconstruction. Instead of the traditionalist approach led by the World Bank and IMF, which 
viewed development as something that occurred ‘after’ conflict, there is a growing consensus 
around a humanitarian approach to reconstruction, which views reconstruction in terms of a 
‘relief-to-development’ continuum. In this formulation, development is seen as the long-term 
solution to humanitarian crises, rather than as an activity to be initiated only after a crisis has 
subsided. In summary, therefore, development is viewed both as an end in itself and as a 
means to address security and humanitarian concerns. 
In broad terms, two specific dimensions of the post-war developmental challenge are 
identifiable in official definitions of post-war reconstruction. The World Bank, for example, 
maintains that reconstruction ‘has two overall objectives: to facilitate the transition to 
sustainable peace after hostilities have ceased, and to support economic and social 
development’ (World Bank 1998: 4). The first development challenge relates to political 
development and concerns building trusting relations between people as well as between 
people and institutions. Indeed, the UNRISD War-torn States Project has argued that the most 
serious challenge facing post-war societies is the ‘destruction of relationships and the loss of 
trust, of confidence, of dignity and of faith’, which has the ‘potential to undermine the 
solutions to all the other problems, be they economic technical, institutional political, 
humanitarian or security-related’. ‘If people do not trust each other and lack trust and 
confidence in government and in the rebuilding process in general, then the best rebuilding 
strategies are likely to fail’ (Stiefel 1998: 13). Amongst the key activities involved in political 
reconstruction are constitutional issues, state institution-building, civil society strengthening 
and transitional justice initiatives. 
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The second development challenge concerns economic development and is about 
growth, inclusiveness, livelihoods and access to services. Much assistance to developing 
countries from international financial institutions has traditionally been governed by the 
assumption that market-oriented economies and liberal democratic polities constitute the 
firmest basis for peace within and between states (Paris 2004). Through the use of ‘structural 
adjustment loans’, this economic approach became particularly influential during the late 
1980s and was characterized by efforts to privatize the public sector, deregulate markets and 
bypass rather than strengthen the state in development contexts. Although the global financial 
crisis since 2008 has reduced confidence in the ability of free markets to deliver social goods, 
particularly in contexts where markets are weak, international development assistance 
continues to be informed by neoliberal theory. 
On the basis of the historical record, Barakat (2010: 249–70) has proposed that post-
war reconstruction must contain several specific elements if it is effectively to address both 
the political and economic challenges described above. First, effective post-war reconstruction 
requires the establishment of a clear recovery vision which is representative of the population 
and which reflects a long-term political commitment to the process encompassed in a national 
policy framework. Second, the establishment of such a national vision requires that 
mechanisms are created for citizen participation in governance processes and structures such 
as national dialogue, drafting or reforming the constitution, elections, the organizing of 
political parties, civil society activities and a free media. From a critical perspective, it has 
been noted that despite the near universal consensus on the need for participatory 
development, the results of such efforts are often disappointing in practice (Cooke and Kothari 
2001). Third, the process of trust-building often requires that post-war reconstruction takes 
place within a conflict transformation framework, guided by the principles of reconciliation 
(Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse 2003). Fourth, physical and economic reconstruction and 
development are crucial in order to generate prosperity and, in turn, generate further recovery 
initiatives. Fifth, benefits from reconstruction and development must be equitable and widely 
shared, given the fact that ‘the origin of many conflicts lies in the perception that certain 
groups do not have the treatment in society that they are entitled to’ (Barakat 2010: 256). 
 It is worth noting that despite the immense challenges involved in post-war 
reconstruction, the post-war period is regarded as a unique opportunity to lay the foundations 
for sustainable peace: ‘the immediate post-conflict period offers a window of opportunity to 
provide basic security, deliver peace dividends, shore up and build confidence in the political 
process, and strengthen core national capacity to lead peace-building efforts. If countries 
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succeed in these core areas early on, it substantially increases the chances for sustainable 
peace – and reduces the risk of relapse into conflict’ (United Nations 2009). 
5. RECONSTRUCTION PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION 
5.1. Reconstruction planning during the war 
It has been noted that ‘there is a general consensus that the best time to plan for reconstruction 
is while the war is on-going, in order that the nation is well-placed for a more rapid 
reconstruction process once the conflict is over’ (Barakat 2010: 252). Even before the Iraqi 
occupiers had been defeated and while US and allied forces were being assembled in the Gulf 
at the end of 1990 in preparation for the launch of ‘Operation Desert Storm’, exiled leaders 
were discussing an array of reconstruction issues, ranging from the rehabilitation of 
infrastructure to the post-war political vision of the country. 
With regard to planning for physical reconstruction, extensive technical assistance was 
provided by the US government in response to a formal request from the Kuwaiti government. 
For their part, the US was motivated by the desire to minimize post-war hardship that could 
give rise to post-war instability (McDonnell 1999: 10). A committee was set up in Washington 
in December 1990, named the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program (KERP), comprised of 
Kuwaiti officials, and advised by a US–Kuwait Task Force comprised of civil affairs military 
personnel (Barlow 2010).The committee was divided into ten working groups covering a 
range of physical, economic, social and political issues. 
In parallel with planning for physical recovery, the political future of Kuwait was 
being discussed by exiled members of the government and opposition. During this period, the 
government was under significant domestic pressure to move towards democratic reform from 
exiled opposition groups such as the Constitutional Movement, which included former 
members of the National Assembly, as well as from the Committee of Forty-Five, a group of 
Kuwaiti business and intellectual elites. Illustrative of widespread sentiment at the time 
regarding the necessity of political change, one exiled member of the National Assembly 
asserted that there was ‘near unanimity that we can’t go back to autocratic rule’ (Bloomberg 
Businessweek 1991). The government also experienced international pressure to endorse a 
more inclusive form of governance in the post-war period (Yetiv 2002: 259), with democratic 
reforms presented as a precondition for the US Congress’s authorization of the forceful 
removal of Iraqi forces from the country. 
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In this context of political weakness, the exiled Kuwaiti government organized a 
conference held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in October 1990, attended by 1,200 Kuwaitis from a 
wide spectrum of backgrounds. Held in the unique circumstances of exile at the hands of an 
existential and external threat to the country, the conference appeared to offer the opportunity 
for the government and opposition groups to renegotiate basic governance arrangements in a 
rare, relatively neutral setting. Discussions were reportedly frank and in depth. In closed 
sessions, the opposition directly expressed dissatisfaction with the Al Sabah’s monopoly on 
power, lack of accountability and inadequate information policy, while the government 
responded by promising greater consultation (Human Rights Watch 1990). 
At the conference, the government committed to political reform, including a return to 
constitutional rule and a degree of political liberalization in the post-war period. The crown 
prince addressed the conference, promising that, upon the liberation of the country, ‘guided by 
the Constitution of 1962, Kuwait will take the necessary measures to consolidate democracy 
and allow for more extensive participation on the part of the masses’ (ibid.: 488). To be sure, 
the government’s insistence that political reform be delayed until after the war was rejected by 
some elements of the opposition, who instead argued for the immediate reinstatement of the 
constitution and the National Assembly along with the formation of a national unity 
government (ibid.). Nevertheless, the conference may be judged to have met with partial 
success in establishing a degree of consensus among elites on the basic governance goals – if 
not the detail – to which the country should aspire once liberation had been secured. 
5.2. Reconstruction implementation 
In contrast to post-war reconstruction efforts that take place in many developing contexts, the 
national recovery operation was not financed by international donors but was rather self-
financed by the Kuwaiti government, through a combination of the country’s US$113 billion 
sovereign wealth funds and its ability to borrow on international markets. Consequently, it 
was the Kuwaitis themselves who established reconstruction priorities (McDonnell 1999: 11). 
The rehabilitation of basic services was a top priority for the returning government, which 
viewed this as a crucial area through which it could bolster public confidence in its ability to 
administer. In addition, as the largest source of revenue for government spending, the oil 
sector was awarded particular attention in the rehabilitation process (Metz 1993). 
Nevertheless, despite reconstruction being shaped by national aspirations, the Kuwaitis 
relied extensively on foreign actors for actual project implementation. In the immediate period 
following liberation, assistance on the ground was provided by civil US army personnel in the 
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largest US civil military operation since World War II (Kifner 1991). Following the defeat of 
the Iraqis, US military troops attached to Task Force Freedom withdrew, paving the way for 
civilian reconstruction led by the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). The latter were 
located within the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office (KERO), under the overall control of 
the US Department of Defense. The KERO was awarded a US$45 million contract to manage 
the initial ninety-day recovery period, and undertook a range of services in emergency 
operations and engineering services such as repair of roads, hospitals, power supplies, sewage 
treatment, and air and sea ports. The KERO also undertook initial project management 
responsibilities including the contracting of western construction and engineering companies 
such as Bechtel Group, Caterpillar, Inc., Motorola and General Motors Company, for which 
the reconstruction was welcome as a lucrative bonanza (Furlong 1992). 
In the political sphere, those who anticipated that the government would move towards 
political liberalization immediately following liberation were disappointed. Instead, the 
government sought to regain control swiftly by pursuing a strategy of reinvigorated 
authoritarianism. Immediately after the defeat of the Iraqis in February 1991, the government 
declared martial law, thus granting the Al Sabah family nearly unlimited power in the running 
of the country. Authoritarian measures were justified by the government on the grounds that 
the establishment of order was required before any liberalization could take place, with the 
crown prince stating in 1991 that future parliamentary elections were dependent on the 
establishment of law and order. In spite of widespread domestic and international criticism 
(Cushman 1991a), martial law remained in force until the following June (Human Rights 
Watch 1992). 
Post-war authoritarianism was coupled with a re-energized policy of exclusionary 
nationalism, with the war being viewed by political elites as an opportunity to address the 
demographic make-up of Kuwaiti society and thereby satisfy paranoia about the country’s 
large expatriate population. The majority of the 400,000 non-Kuwaiti residents who had fled 
during the war were not permitted to return, while others were forcibly deported (Metz 1993). 
Numerically, Palestinian and Jordanian residents, whose political leadership had supported 
Saddam Hussein during the war, were most affected by this policy. Prior to the war, 
Palestinians had constituted Kuwait’s largest foreign population, with an estimated number of 
400,000; by 1992, fewer than 30,000 remained (Metz 1993). On the eve of the Iraqi invasion 
in 1990, the population had stood at 2,200,000, of which non-Kuwaitis accounted for 73 per 
cent. By 1993, the population had decreased to 1,600,000, and the share of non-Kuwaitis had 
fallen to 60 per cent (Gulf Labour Markets and Migration). 
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Meanwhile, foreign residents and Bidun who had remained in Kuwait were targeted in 
a large-scale campaign of retribution, amid accusations that such groups had collaborated with 
the Iraqi occupiers. Those accused were tried in a series of military ‘collaboration’ trials, in 
spite of international criticism relating to both the suspension of due judicial process 
(including the use of torture to procure evidence) and the perceived harshness of judgements 
(Cushman 1991a). During this period, non-Kuwaitis in particular suffered summary 
executions and beatings, many of which were reported to have occurred at the hands of 
official security forces as well as those of vigilante or irregular armed groups allied to the state 
(Human Rights Watch 1992). In total, during the period of martial law twenty-nine people 
were reportedly given death sentences (although under international pressure these were later 
commuted to life sentences) (Cushman 1991a). 
6. EVALUATING KUWAIT’S POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION 
This section assesses the extent to which the key elements of post-war reconstruction, as 
described in section 4, were achieved in the case of Kuwait’s reconstruction. 
6.1. Vision and participation 
The task of assessing the extent to which a coherent vision of reconstruction existed is 
complicated by the relatively opaque and closed nature of post-war debates, decision-making 
and policy formation. Nevertheless, two themes were more explicitly reflected in post-war 
policies than others. The first related to internal regime stability and, as described above, 
involved post-war authoritarian measures (notably martial law) designed to protect the regime, 
as well as a revised and reduced vision concerning the role of non-Kuwaitis. In addition, 
especially in the longer term, regime stability required the continuation of the pre-war social 
contract whereby citizens ceded the right to political participation in return for comprehensive 
welfare provision. In turn this required the state to continue to be economically independent 
from its citizenry. 
The second theme of the post-war vision related to external security. In this regard, the 
key lessons learned by the Kuwaiti government from the Iraqi invasion were the inadequacies 
of its defences and the need to secure from its US patron greater protection. This is evidenced 
by the signing of a ten-year, bilateral defence pact between the two countries in 1991 (and 
renewed in 2001), as well as extensive post-war arms purchases by Kuwait from the US. 
These included a 1992 order of five Patriot anti-missile units and forty combat aircraft, and a 
US$1.9 billion order of 218 tanks in 1993 (Katzman 2005: 5). 
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The major criticism of this vision of Kuwait’s post-war development was that it 
reflected the interests of the ruling elite rather than those of Kuwaitis more broadly. While 
some opposition figures accepted the basic premise of the need to restore order before 
liberalization in the immediate post-war period, they argued for a government of national 
unity to oversee the transitional period (Nafisi 1991). Thus, the lack of a widely agreed post-
war vision was a symptom of a lack of popular participation in post-war decision-making, 
which in turn was an issue of political dissatisfaction amongst many groups. Both those who 
remained in Kuwait during the occupation and those who led the resistance against the Iraqis 
felt unjustly excluded from the post-war political process and particularly felt resentment. This 
point was articulated by a leading member of the opposition movement, the National 
Constitutional Front, just days after the expulsion of Iraqi forces: 
It would be especially unconscionable to exclude those who stayed in Kuwait during the last 
several months. In the face of torture and execution, the whole organized society of Kuwait – 
from the mosques to students, professional associations and trade unions to the actual military 
resistance – literally ran Kuwait from the underground during the Iraqi occupation. Why 
shouldn’t their participation be continued now that the tribal lords have returned from their 
luxury hotels in Taif? (ibid.) 
Under pressure for reform, in April 1991 the government reshuffled the Cabinet. 
However, the move was heavily criticized by opposition politicians for rewarding the same 
elites who were seen to have brought national disaster. The leader of the liberal Democratic 
Forum group responded negatively to the reshuffle by stating: ‘we have no democracy in 
Kuwait. It’s very clear. We are asking for democracy, the implementation of the suspended 
Constitution, forming a real democratic government and to have human rights – individual 
rights to speak, to read, to write, to have a small conference, which is forbidden’ (Gargan 
1991). 
The government’s post-war vision was similarly divisive with respect to policies aimed 
at guaranteeing Kuwait’s international security. While the government’s response to its newly 
perceived vulnerability was to deepen its strategic alliance with the US, many Kuwaitis 
believed that the reason for the feebleness of Kuwait’s defence in the face of Iraqi invasion 
also lay in internal arrangements, particularly incompetence within the government and armed 
forces. As Yetiv (2002: 262) has written, ‘the sheer shock of the crisis also raised questions 
about the efficacy of the ruling family, and its inability to prevent the invasion or prepare the 
nation for it’. Consequently, the aftermath of the war was characterized by calls from 
opposition figures for official inquiries into what was perceived as the government’s failure to 
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pre-empt and prepare for the war, including allegations that the armed forces were grossly 
unprepared, in spite of repeated threats from Saddam (Nafisi 1991). However, such requests 
went unfulfilled, while many were also left dismayed by the re-imposition of the same 
censorship arrangements on the press, which had come under criticism for not adequately 
recognizing and communicating the threat of invasion (Efron 1991). 
The failure to integrate widespread demands for greater governance accountability and 
popular participation into the post-war recovery framework served to undermine the 
government’s legitimacy amongst a population which not only disagreed with its political 
aims but believed it to lack competence in the core tasks of governing. This sentiment was 
encapsulated by the chairman of the board of directors of Gulf Bank, who stated that ‘people 
fear that a government of defeat cannot really be a government of reconstruction’ (Efron 
1991). The perception of an out-of-touch leadership bent on reproducing the pre-war 
governance arrangements was only heightened by the delaying of elections. After mounting 
pressure, in June 1991 the emir declared that elections would be held in October 1992 and that 
the National Council would resume meetings in the meantime. Had the government acted 
more swiftly in responding to popular demands for governance reform, opposition figures 
might have been persuaded to grant it the benefit of the doubt. 
As it was, the government failed to capitalize on the window of opportunity represented 
by the brief moment of post-liberation national unity. For many, delaying elections until 
twenty months after liberation represented simply too long a timetable, and it led some 
opposition leaders to argue that the government planned to use the National Council (regarded 
as unconstitutional) as a delaying tactic to obstruct democratic progress and to perpetuate 
authoritarian rule (Nafisi 1991). Others claimed that the government intended to use the period 
of time prior to the election to amend election laws and gerrymander electoral districts. In 
addition, when elections were held in 1992, women continued to be denied the right to vote 
and to stand in elections, the government thus failing to engage half the population in the 
immediate post-war period (CNN 2005). 
6.2. Reconstruction and development 
As noted above, an integral part of the government’s post-war vision was the achievement of 
regime stability through the restoration of the pre-war social contract whereby the state 
provided for the welfare of its citizenry. Consequently, the restoration of the oil sector as the 
major driver of that economic system was a key post-war priority. 
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This aspect of the recovery can be considered a strong success, because the speed with 
which the recovery of the oil sector was achieved stunned observers. By early 1993, crude oil 
production had returned to pre-invasion levels, and refinery capacity was fully restored by 
1994. Rehabilitation of the oil sector drove rapid recovery-based GDP growth in the two years 
following the war, increasing by 75 per cent and 24.2 per cent in 1993 and 1994, respectively, 
after which it followed pre-war patterns (Pfeifer 2004). In this respect, oil-fuelled economic 
recovery was achieved at a remarkable pace. 
Importantly, the post-war economic recovery, driven by the oil sector, enabled the 
government to overcome post-liberation instability by effectively buying off the political 
aspirations of Kuwaiti citizens through a re-establishment of the pre-conflict power-for-
welfare trade-off (ibid.). Thus, in the face of deep hostility after liberation, the government 
sought to quell dissent by further ramping up pre-war welfare payments. In 1991 the 
government cancelled consumer loans outstanding at the time of the Iraqi invasion, while in 
1992 it increased Kuwaiti citizens’ salaries by 25 per cent and significantly increased domestic 
subsidies and transfers (including subsidization of utilities and access to free healthcare and 
education) (Fennell 1997). 
Despite the impressiveness of the speed with which macro-economic recovery and a 
return to growth were achieved, the major criticism of this recreated rentier system was that it 
represented a short-term ‘sticking plaster’ on Kuwait’s political and economic challenges 
rather than a durable solution. First, the reliance on oil revenue for the post-war economy 
served to increase Kuwait’s vulnerability to the eventuality of international oil price decline or 
stagnation, and therefore made the pre-war social contract untenable. By 1994, oil revenue 
accounted for 50 per cent of GDP and 75 per cent of government revenues (Pfeifer 2004), and 
it has retained a similar position in the economy since. 
Second, the steady increase in Kuwait’s population in the two decades since the 
liberation has highlighted the unsustainability of the guarantee of employment in the public 
sector for Kuwaiti citizens (ibid.). Yet, in spite of the urgent need to increase the economic 
activeness of Kuwaiti citizens, especially in the private sector, few options exist in this regard 
due to the low quality of Kuwaiti human resources. Approximately 26 per cent of Kuwaitis 
have completed secondary education and 8 per cent have undertaken higher education, while 
no vocational education system has been developed (Baldwin-Edwards 2011). Such human 
resource levels in contemporary Kuwait reflect a post-war development strategy that 
prioritized current spending (primarily in salaries, subsidies and transfers) rather than capital 
spending. Whereas current expenditure more than doubled as a percentage of GDP between 
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1980 and 1995, from 23 to 51 per cent, capital spending remained steady at approximately 7 
per cent of GDP during this period. Investment levels in education are indicative of this 
overall pattern: although spiking in 1992, they only marginally increased between 1986 and 
1996, from 5.4 per cent to 5.9 per cent of GDP, and by 2006 had fallen to 3.8 per cent (United 
Nations Data n.d.). The failure to invest in a sustainable economic future reflects the post-war 
vision of ensuring stability through reconstructing the pre-war model of a state financially and 
politically independence of its citizenry. 
6.3. Equity and reconciliation 
An important dimension of the government’s post-war strategy for ensuring regime stability 
concerned its vision for the role of non-Kuwaiti citizens in the post-war era. As described 
above, the war was viewed by the Al Sabah elite as an opportunity to limit the number of non-
Kuwaitis and the economic and political role of those who remained. This strategy served the 
overall goal of regime stability in both political and economic terms. Politically, exclusionary 
nationalistic policies satisfied the political elite’s paranoia regarding the threat posed to 
Kuwait’s cultural integrity by the majority non-Kuwaiti population. Economically, strictly 
limiting citizenship served the government’s interests as it minimized the size of the 
population eligible for welfare benefits. The government’s post-war demographic policies had 
important impacts on social and economic aspects of reconstruction. 
First, the government’s post-war narrative of collaboration and betrayal, principally 
targeted at non-Kuwaitis, undermined the prospects for reconciliation. Such a narrative 
generated an unprecedented culture of mistrust among Kuwaiti society, particularly against the 
stateless Bidun and the remaining Palestinians. As a newspaper report from 1992 stated, ‘in 
the eyes of most Kuwaitis, the tens of thousands of Bidun were collaborators with Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein’s brutal occupation army’ (Fineman 1992). According to one 
Bidun interviewed by the organization Human Rights Watch: ‘when the [1990 Iraqi] invasion 
happened, that’s when everything changed for the Bidun. People started looking at the Bidun 
suspiciously. There are families back in the day who were friends, then suddenly … there was 
this lack of trust and … overall xenophobia’ (Human Rights Watch 2011). 
Second, post-war policies aimed at limiting the social and economic role of non-
Kuwaiti citizens, including long-term residents, perpetuated a deeply unequal system that 
destroyed social cohesion between those who had experienced the occupation. Some 
commentators have argued that the war served to create a greater sense of collective interests 
and cooperation (Yetiv 2002). However, the opportunity to capitalize on this momentary 
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cohesion was undermined by the conscious reproduction of a society segregated between 
citizens and non-citizens. The government’s determination to resist the adoption of a broader 
notion of citizenship in the post-war period resulted in the failure to address the socio-
economic exclusion experienced by the 106,000 post-war Bidun population, with a web of 
legal and bureaucratic obstacles to Bidun naturalization arising in the years following the war. 
Consequently, a sizeable minority of Kuwait’s long-term resident population continues to be 
excluded from the country’s extensive welfare system and experiences restricted access to 
healthcare, education and employment (Human Rights Watch 2011). 
Third, the forced exodus of much of the non-Kuwaiti workforce in the aftermath of 
war exacerbated challenges to reconstruction and development in key sectors, largely due to 
lack of qualified personnel among the Kuwaiti citizenry (Metz 1993). Prior to the war, 
foreigners had dominated the professional middle class and had therefore comprised the 
backbone of the civil service, banking, education and health sectors. As Pfeifer has noted, 
‘virtually every dimension of the modern Kuwaiti economy, from its financial institutions to 
its custodial services, was built and catered by expatriates’ (Pfeifer 2004: 213). Palestinians 
were particularly vital, constituting the most economically and socially integrated 
communities in Kuwait, and providing much of the country’s skilled workforce. Nearly two 
years after the liberation, one newspaper reported the catastrophic development results of the 
government’s post-war demographic policy: ‘it has left behind empty schools, half-full 
hospitals, empty low-rent apartment blocks and an emerging private-sector economy critically 
short on efficient, skilled labour’ (Fineman 1992). The quality of education and healthcare was 
perceived by many to have suffered, thus further undermining public confidence in the 
government’s ability to manage the reconstruction effectively. The lack of skilled human 
resources in post-war contexts has been noted as a key challenge to the delivery of post-war 
reconstruction goals. In the case of Kuwait, this lack of post-war capacity was exacerbated by 
the government’s post-war strategy of ‘depoliticizing’ the labour force. 
7. CONCLUSION 
Kuwait’s reconstruction after its liberation from Iraq in 1991 constitutes an interesting case 
study of the peace-building and development challenges and opportunities that confront 
societies rebuilding after war. The process was underpinned by a post-war vision centred on 
the notion of regime security and which can broadly be characterized as the business-as-usual 
restoration of the pre-war autocratic governance model. On the one hand, this vision entailed 
the rapid recovery of oil-driven reconstruction and growth, which was achieved at an 
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impressive speed. However, the government’s vision of post-war authoritarianism conflicted 
with re-energized demands for greater political participation and accountable governance. In 
addition, the vision was inherently both unsustainable, underpinned as it was by oil-led 
growth, and unequal, with the government capitalizing on the war to restrict the societal role 
of non-Kuwaiti citizens. The Kuwait experience offers several additional insights relevant to 
the broader field of post-war reconstruction. 
First, the Kuwait reconstruction illustrates a common dilemma facing governments in 
the aftermath of war which may be termed ‘effectiveness versus legitimacy’. Facing an 
emergency situation characterized by the urgent need to provide for basic human needs and 
services, as well as a lack of order and domestic political instability, the returning Al Sabah 
government sought to re-establish strong central state authority by adopting martial law and 
other strongly authoritarian post-war tactics. Authoritarianism had the advantage of enabling 
the government to establish order and authority relatively quickly, in turn allowing it to 
coordinate the relief and recovery efforts, including the restoration of basic infrastructure and 
the oil sector. However, these achievements, and the consequent exclusion of popular 
participation in determining the post-war vision, came at the cost of failing to rebuild popular 
trust and confidence in the government. The government’s refusal to accept responsibility for 
the war, instead exacting retribution from non-nationals, meant that grudges and resentment 
between social groups were not dealt with, with costs to social cohesion and lingering 
grievances over perceived injustices. 
Second, the Kuwait case illustrates the heavily politicized atmosphere in which post-
war recovery often takes place and the consequences this has for post-war development. 
Despite the urgency of development needs in 1991, the government’s decision to exact 
retribution from and to expel thousands of Palestinians and other non-Kuwaitis, dictated by 
the government’s nationalistic policy framework, was a profoundly anti-developmental action. 
As a consequence, many aspects of the economy, public administration and services 
deteriorated in the post-war period, undermining public confidence in the reconstruction 
effort. In addition, the government’s post-war rejection of political reform obstructed 
economic reform and renegotiation of the social contract, including reduced welfare spending. 
Third, the Kuwait experience highlights the fact that any post-war window of 
opportunity for greater reconciliation is small. The war provided an opportunity for the 
government and opposition to engage in constructive dialogue and establish basic consensus 
on post-war governance agreements. In the immediate post-war period, the government had 
the chance to demonstrate that it understood demands for popular political participation and 
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that it was sincere in its pledges to enact political reform. Yet the government’s delay in 
honouring such commitments proved costly and, when the Al Sabah finally declared elections 
more than a year after liberation, they found that they had already lost the confidence and trust 
of many. 
Finally, Kuwait’s reconstruction demonstrates the long-term impact of policy decisions 
taken in the post-war period. The outbreak of protests in Kuwait during and following the 
Arab Spring reflects popular rejection of a political system recreated autocratically in the 
period following the war. Ironically, in many respects reconstruction reinforced the same 
structural vulnerabilities that had existed prior to the war and which had brought Kuwait to the 
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